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Legal Struggles and Political Mobilization around Gender Quotas 
This paper is part of a case study series stemming from a project, “Gender quotas in Europe: Towards 
European Parity Citizenship?" funded by the European University Institute Research Council and Jean 
Monnet Life Long Learning Programme under the scientific coordination of Professors Ruth Rubio-
Marín and Eléonore Lépinard. Gender quotas are part of a global trend to improve women’s 
representation in decision-making bodies. In the past decade they have often been extended in terms of 
the numbers to be reached (40 or 50% instead of 30%), and in terms of the social field they should 
apply to (from politics to the economy to the administration). The aim of the project is to assess and 
analyse this global trend in the European context, comparing the adoption (or resistance to) gender 
quotas in 13 European countries in the fields of electoral politics, corporate boards and public bodies.  
The case-studies in this series consider the legal struggles and political mobilization around Gender 
Quotas in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, 
Spain, Sweden, and the U.K. They were presented and discussed in earlier versions at a workshop held 
in September 2014 at the EUI.  Based on the workshop method, all working papers have reflected on 
similar aspects raised by their country case, concerning: 1) domestic/national preconditions and 
processes of adoption of gender quotas; 2) transnational factors; 3) legal and constitutional challenges 
raised by gender quotas in both the political and economic spheres; and 4) new frontiers in the field.  
The working papers will be also made available on the blog of the workshop, where additional 
information on the experts and country information sheets can be found, and new developments can be 
shared. https://blogs.eui.eu/genderquotas. 
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Abstract 
In 2007 Spain introduced statutory electoral and corporate board gender quotas as part of a broader 
gender equality programme. These quotas greatly differ with regard to the parity criteria in use, the 
period of application, and the measures for promoting compliance or sanctioning non-compliance. 
Electoral quotas are by far the most successful ones. This paper seeks to tease out why corporate board 
quotas lag behind electoral gender quotas. To explain this differential approach to gender quotas we 
assess the broader institutional configuration affecting these reform processes by looking at the 
obstacles and enabling (national and international) factors, the actors and networks pushing for or 
resisting each of the quota reforms as well as their framing strategies. We conclude that most of the 
enabling factors that exercised pressure in favour of gender quotas in politics were weak or missing in 
the economic sector and, thus, could not counteract the strong oppositional factors. 
Keywords 
Gender quotas, parity, feminist institutionalism, political parties, corporate boards. 
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 1 
Introduction 
The way to women’s citizenship as full members of a political community includes, together with civil 
and social rights, the enjoyment of equal political rights. In the past few decades, the use of state 
power to promote gender equality in politics through the introduction of gender quotas has expanded 
(Franceschet and Piscopo, 2013: 301). This expansion affects the number of countries where gender 
quotas are in use, the proportion of either sex representation mandated by quotas, and the type of 
institutions in which these measures are implemented. Women and politics scholars have identified 
different “generations” of gender quotas. The first generation aimed at addressing the gender 
imbalance of parliaments, the second generation sought to promote women’s presence in public 
administration advisory boards and the last generation targeted the boards of listed and state-owned 
companies (Holli 2011). While gender quotas are a global phenomenon (Dahlerup 2006; Krook 2009), 
countries with legislated gender quotas do not necessarily apply them to all spheres (political, 
administrative and economic). Lack of comprehensive and comparative studies prevent us from 
knowing whether groups of gender quotas within country are more similar than different types of 
quotas across countries (Meier 2014).  
This paper adapts and expands Krook’s (2009) feminist institutionalist framework to assess the 
introduction of gender quotas in the Spanish case. Indeed, each of these types of quota reforms faces a 
different institutional configuration with a particular set of interactions between systemic, normative 
and practical institutions, which may result in either good fit or conflict (Krook 2009). Also, the 
political opportunities structure opened up to equality activists and networks of gender advocates to 
pass these quotas might significantly vary as it might differ the degree of international pressures that 
stimulate countries to pass new legislation. Spain is one of the few countries where the three types of 
quotas have been adopted, although they present large dissimilarities with regard to the parity criteria 
in use, the timing of application and the measures seeking to incentivize compliance or sanctioning 
non-compliance. Electoral quotas are by far the most successful ones.  
The Spanish case is intriguing since the different types of quotas steamed from a broader gender 
equality plan but immediate and strong measures were only applied to the political sphere. This paper 
seeks to tease out why corporate board quotas lag behind electoral gender quotas in the Spanish case. 
In doing so, we will assess the obstacles and enabling (national and international) factors, the windows 
of opportunity, the actors and networks pushing for or resisting each of the quota reforms as well as 
their framing and discursive strategies.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the theoretical framework that informs the 
paper. Sections 3 and 4 explore the institutional configurations and the enabling factors and actors for 
both electoral and corporate gender quotas, respectively, in the case of Spain. Section 5 discusses the 
continuities and discontinuities of quota reform processes as well as the challenges currently in place. 
Last, the paper concludes by signaling the differential sequences followed by quota reforms in politics 
(strong regulation) and the economic field (self-regulation).  
Institutional configurations, enabling factors and actors in quota adoption 
Quota reforms interact with previous institutions and may thus require multiple attempts to be adopted 
or to secure an effective implementation (Krook 2009: 52). This section reviews the institutional 
configurations that intersect in processes of quota adoption as well as the political opportunities 
structure opened up to equality activists and networks of gender advocates, including international 
pressures. We borrow Krook’s (2009) feminist institutionalist approach to the study of electoral 
gender quotas and expand it to corporate gender quotas, as summarized in Table 1. Specifically, we 
identify the enabling and constraining factors for quotas in politics and corporate boards and discuss 
how these factors might work differently in these domains. The analysis of these institutions, be they 
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formal or informal rules, will also help us identify resistances to changes promoted by gender 
initiatives (Lombardo and Mergaert 2013). 
At the political level, systemic institutions that shape candidate recruitment processes involve the 
formal features of political competition, mainly electoral rules and the type of party systems. On the 
one hand, PR systems facilitate women’s representation and produce better fit with quotas as they are 
inspired by norms of group participation whereas majoritarian systems prioritize individuals over 
groups (Krook et al. 2009: 790). With closed party lists, women need being placed on winnable 
positions, whereas open lists may work to the advantage of well-known male candidates, particularly 
in countries with more traditional views of gender roles. Within PR systems, levels of women elected 
tend to be higher in large multi-member districts (Norris 2004). Yet, where district magnitude is large 
but many parties compete for seats, women may have just as hard a time obtaining candidacies as in 
systems with fewer parties and smaller district magnitudes, thus party magnitude is a very relevant 
variable (Matland 1993). On the other hand, contagion effects whereby parties respond to the 
innovations of their competitors, such as the adoption of party quotas, are mainly found in multi-party 
systems (Matland and Studlar 1996).  
At the economic level, systemic institutions shaping recruitment practices are more difficult to 
identify. Firstly, companies do not compete in the same markets and there is a low visibility of their 
governing boards, thus “contagion effects” are likely to be weaker. Secondly, in the economic sphere 
the internal functioning of firms is largely left to industry self-regulation instruments (e.g. Corporate 
Governance Codes). Yet, most states regulate to some extent corporate boards, so their composition 
can be at least partially influenced through legal requisites such as transparency and independence of 
(some) board members. Thus, the higher the state intervention in the regulation of boards in a given 
country, the strongest fit of gender quotas in corporate boards we might expect (see Engelstad and 
Teigen 2012; Suk 2011).  
Regarding normative institutions, political actors are also influenced by ideational factors. These 
include existing conceptions of equality (opportunities vs. results) and representation (politics of ideas 
vs. politics of presence). Gender quotas are more easily adopted when legislation (constitution, 
electoral law, etc.), party ideologies or mass beliefs support equality of results and place value in 
representatives’ characteristics (Dahlerup 2007). Left parties are more sensitive to equality of results 
and to promoting women’s presence (Caul Kittilson 2006), having been invested in overturning the 
traditional gender gap in voting behaviour that benefited the right.  
In the economic sphere, conceptions of state involvement in the economy may affect whether 
corporate boards are the targets of quotas or not. Where acceptance of state intervention in the 
economy is spread, gender quotas will be considered more legitimate than where beliefs about private 
business freedom prevail (Tienari et al 2009; Casey et al. 2011; Fagan et al. 2012). As to conceptions 
of equality, in business expertise arguments might trump the plea for diversity, although there is a 
bourgeoning literature on its advantages for firms’ functioning (see Piscopo and Clark 2013). Equality 
of opportunities and meritocracy (expertise, efficiency, best-fit) prevail over notions of equality of 
outcome. Normative arguments based on equality of results and the politics of presence are usually 
seen with reluctance by business actors which may be more convinced instead by productivity 
arguments, namely the economic benefits of women’s inclusion and higher diversity on corporate 
boards – e.g. risk management in investments, broader reach of consumption habits, etc. (Teigen 2012: 
135).Political parties make the formal and informal practices or practical institutions that ultimately 
rule over candidate selection. Individual traits (resources and motivations) influence the “supply” of 
candidates from different groups, but candidate selection practices are also shaped by the “demands” 
of party selectorates (Lovenduski and Norris 1993). Gender norms in the definition of the ‘ideal 
candidate’ (Chapman 1993; Kenny 2013) are coupled with a strong gender imbalance of party 
selectorates (Niven 1998). Men in top positions tend to be supportive of in-group candidates (men) at 
the expense of out-group candidates (women). 
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Recruitment processes in corporate boards are also shaped by gender norms and stereotypes in the 
assessment of curriculums and by the pervasiveness of male-dominated business networks and opaque 
and endogamic practices that exclude women and show a preference for homogeneous boards (Mateos 
Gimeno and Escot 2010; Castaño 2009; Villiers 2010; Branson 2007). Since the election of the 
members of corporate boards proportionally reflects participation in capital, the size of the board is 
crucial: the greater the number of posts stakeholders have, the larger room for diversity there is (see 
Bianco, Ciavarella and Signoretti 2011), which might be correlated with firm size (Hillman et al 2007; 
Miller and Triana 2009).  
Table 1: Institutional Configurations of Gender Quotas 
 Quota type 
Electoral quotas Corporate board quotas 
Systemic 
institutions 
 Electoral rules 
 Party competition 
 Self-regulation code prevails although most 
states also impose some regulation of 
corporate boards 
 Companies do not compete in the same 
markets and low visibility of corporate 
boards 
 Structure of firm ownership 
 Degree of state intervention in the economy 
Normative 
institutions 
 Conceptions of equality: equality of 
results and politics of presence 
defended by a variety of actors 
 Conceptions of equality: equality of 
opportunity and meritocracy (expertise) 
prevail 
 Conceptions of state involvement in the 
economy 
Practical 
institutions 
 Local power monopolies 
 Informal networks 
 The ideal (male) candidate 
 Opacity and endogamy 
 Informal networks 
 The ideal (male) candidate 
The successful adoption of gender quotas also depends on the political and discursive context and 
opportunities existing for feminist advocates to make their gender equality claims resonate within 
existing political institutions (Ferree 2012). Critical actors (Celis 2006), such as women within 
political parties, have a crucial role in devising strategies to put these claims on the agenda (Kunovich 
and Paxton 2005; Caul Kittilson 2006; Freidenvall 2013). Last, pressures by international 
organisations, especially the European Union (EU), need to be considered too. Although the EU has 
not adopted legally binding directives on gender quotas yet, its endorsement of positive actions in the 
Treaties and the development of soft policy measures on women’s political representation have 
contributed to promote social learning on this issue in the member states (Lombardo 2008; Beveridge 
2012). Europeanization entails not only the downloading of EU legislation at the member state level 
and the discursive usage of the EU to legitimise gender change at the national level, but also the 
uploading of policy measures from member states to the EU level as well as the horizontal cross-
loading or policy transfer that implies learning from other European countries (Howell 2004). 
Electoral quotas 
The institutional configuration for the adoption of electoral gender quotas through the 2007 Equality 
Law presented a highly harmonizing sequence (Verge 2013). Left-wing political parties had already 
adopted voluntary quotas in the late 1980s, for both electoral lists and party executive boards, due to 
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lobbying by party feminist activists with strong ties with the women’s movement and with other 
European parties where quotas had already been passed, as well as with the International Socialist 
Women (Valiente 2005; Verge 2006). As suggested by Krook (2006: 316), emulation is easier among 
countries that share historical ties. In the Spanish case, among the Socialist party family, the French 
Parti Socialiste was the most influential. This favoured a cross-loading of quota measures. In 1979 it 
invited sister parties to the launch of its quota campaign for the European elections, thereby inspiring 
Spanish feminists to fight for a similar measure in their own parties.   
In 1982, the PSC, a party that substitutes organically for the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) 
in the region of Catalonia, introduced a quota of 12 per cent of party and elected offices for women – 
the party’s female membership at the time. Party feminists, supported by the party leader, convinced 
(male) conference delegates (there was only one woman) to have a floor vote on the quota proposal, 
arguing it did not stand a good chance of passing but it would constitute a great opportunity to raise 
the party’s awareness about equal representation. Surprisingly, the quota was backed by 52 per cent of 
the delegates. In 1987, male mid-level cadres, headed by the very same secretary of the organisation, 
opposed raising the quota to 25 per cent; therefore it was just updated to the increase in women’s 
membership (15 per cent). In the mid-1980s the women’s caucuses in both the Communist Party 
(PCE) and the PSOE lobbied their respective party leaders and launched intra-party campaigns to have 
a quota approved. Both parties introduced a 25 per cent quota for women in 1987 and 1988, 
respectively. This very same quota was introduced by United Left (IU) in 1989, the new political 
platform founded by the PCE in coalition with other left-wing minor parties.  
The PR electoral system coupled with closed party lists allowed these self-reformed parties to 
significantly increase the proportion of female candidates as well as the levels of elected women MPs. 
This especially occurred once the quotas were effectively enforced by the party leadership to winnable 
positions on party lists – which was easier for the PSOE than for the IU due to higher party magnitude. 
In 1997, the concerted effort of party feminists and women’s organizations along with international 
calls for gender equality in representation – UN Beijing Platform of Action (1995), EU IV Plan of 
Action on Equality of Opportunities (1996-2000), Socialist International Women – pushed left-wing 
parties to assume a gender-neutral quota which stipulates that each sex shall be represented at no lower 
proportion than 40 per cent or more than 60 per cent. The rest of parties of the Spanish party system 
adopted similar measures in the following decade and even the Popular Party (Partido Popular, PP), 
which strongly rejects quotas, adopted a vague goal for gender balance (Verge 2006). This paved the 
way for normative-legal reform.  
Between 1996 and 2003, inspired by other European countries, IU and the PSOE submitted several 
bills on women’s political representation which had been discussed with constitutional law experts in 
order to avoid the fate quota laws experienced in France and Italy – i.e. annulment by their respective 
constitutional courts– and supported by the Spanish Committee of the European Women’s Lobby 
(Jenson and Valiente 2003: 91). All these bills failed due to the blockade of the PP majority in the 
lower house. The PP also boycotted normative reform at the regional level by taking the regional 
quota laws passed by PSOE regional governments to the Constitutional Court (Verge 2012: 402). At 
the discursive level, the frame analysis of official policy documents founds a highly polarised 
discourse between the PSOE, clearly in favour of quotas, and the PP, vocally against them. While the 
PSOE defended quotas as a means to improve the quality and fairness of democracy, the PP rejected 
them with a discourse based on individual responsibility and the denial of structural obstacles to 
women’s equal political representation1 (Lombardo 2008; Verge 2006). Gender experts and women’s 
NGOs put forward broader alternative framings that problematized male domination of power 
                                                     
1 The PP objection to quotas used three main arguments: (i) quotas are considered humiliating for women since qualified 
women do not need quotas to succeed in politics; (ii) competition for political positions should promote the most capable 
individuals; and, (iii) the imposition of legally-binding measures on parties is unconstitutional because it curtails their 
freedom of election. 
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positions, gender-biased political practices and the persistence of patriarchal structures hindering 
women’s political representation, but these framings remained rather marginal in Spanish political 
debates.  
Progress towards gender equality in politics was made in 2007, when the PSOE government, through 
its General Secretary for Equality guided by the feminist sociologist Soledad Murillo, drafted the Law 
for the Effective Equality of Women and Men, known as the Equality Law, which was approved with 
the sole abstention of the PP. The latter opposed precisely to the introduction of quotas, despite the 
fact that the law used the expression ‘principle of balanced presence’ to ‘sweeten the pill’ of quotas 
and so attract PP’s positive vote. This principle reforms the electoral law by mandating party lists, for 
all elections, to include a minimum of 40 per cent and a maximum of 60 per cent of either sex, a 
proportion to be also respected in each stretch of five candidates. Non-compliance entails the 
withdrawal of party lists.  
Despite the lack of extensive debate on the constitutionality of quotas, the PP lodged a new appeal, 
which was rejected in 2008.
2
 The Court argued that the Constitution explicitly grants equality of 
outcome and its article 9.2 urges public authorities to remove the obstacles hindering citizen’s political 
participation and to promote and facilitate the conditions so that its exercise is effective. The main 
arguments used by the Constitutional Court to uphold the statutory quota were that quotas did not 
breach the principle of equality but rather granted equality, and that the Equality Law did not 
discriminate against men because it established minimum and maximum proportions for either sex. 
The Court stated that the positive action measure established in the 3/2007 Law was reasonable and 
proportionate with the aim pursued. It also argued that the measure did not violate the unity of the 
electoral corps because candidates, irrespective of their sex, represent the whole electorate during their 
mandate. Further arguments in support of substantive equality and democracy that the Court put 
forward included reference to the obstacles women traditionally face in politics as a legitimate reason 
to require parties to ensure the balanced participation of both sexes, and the idea that, since women 
constitute half the population, the increase of their presence in public office supports the democratic 
principle requiring the closest identity between elected representatives and the represented. A final 
reason given by the Spanish Court is that the law could limit parties’ freedom, as it happens with other 
legal ineligibility causes, because it is citizens, not parties, who enjoy the rights of passive and active 
suffrage (Verge 2012: 403-4).  
The implementation of the statutory quota, as well as the previous party quotas, was eased by the fact 
that elections at all levels of government are held under proportional representation (D’Hondt system) 
using closed and blocked party lists, with the exception of the upper house. As a result of this measure, 
as shown in Graph 1, gender balance has been reached in most regional parliaments since 2007
3
. 
Significant increases have also reached local councils and the upper house, whereas stagnation is 
observed in the lower house – mainly due to the pervasive gender-biased allocation of safe positions 
and the dramatic decrease of PSOE seats share in the past two general elections. Overall, the 
legislative electoral quota consolidated the incremental track initiated through party quotas in the late 
1980s (Verge 2013). 
The political opportunity opened up for gender equality by Zapatero’s government also affected the 
executive branch. Parity cabinets with an equal number of female and male ministers where appointed 
                                                     
2 Sentence 12/2008 of 29 January 2008, accessed 12/11/2014 at http://www.tribunalconstitucional.es/es/jurisprudencia/Pagin 
as/Sentencia.aspx?cod=15691 
3 Regional quota laws had also been passed in five regions before the approval of the Equality Law: Andalusia (2005), 
Balearic Islands (2002), Basque Country (2005) and Castile La Mancha (2002). They have all introduced ‘zipping’, 
where men and women candidates must alternate throughout the list, but the Basque law which establishes 50 per cent of 
positions for either sex. Those regional laws passed in 2002 could not be applied to regional elections until 2007 since the 
PP government had lodged an appeal to the Constitutional Court that suspended their implementation. The appeal was 
withdrawn by the PSOE government in 2004.   
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from 2004 until 2011. Subsequent PP governments, despite breaking the trend with 31 per cent 
women’s representation, show a much higher percentage of women than former conservative 
governments. However, below the ministerial level, even under the PSOE governments, the 
percentage of women in top executive positions has not reached more than 25 per cent (CES 2011). 
Graph 1. Percentage of Women in Public office, 1979-2011 
 
Source: Own Elaboration Based on Verge (2012). 
Quotas for corporate boards 
While women’s presence in politics has remarkably advanced in Spain, progress has been slow and 
rather marginal in the economic sphere. Positive action affecting corporate boards was initially 
introduced in 2006 when the Stock Market’s National Committee, a supervisory governmental agency, 
elaborated a new industry self-regulation instrument, the Unified Good Governance Code, known as 
Conthe Code, of voluntary application by companies. One of the most contested parts of the Code 
concerned gender diversity in corporate boards. Recommendation 15 of the Code required companies 
with few or no women on their board to explain the reasons for it and undertake actions to correct this 
situation, paying special attention to the obstacles found by women in recruitment processes. This can 
be defined as a “soft quota” or “soft law” since improvement depends on the willingness of individual 
firms and their managers (Fagan et al. 2012).  
Simultaneously, though, the PSOE government intended to impose further measures on corporate 
boards. While the Spanish government might have taken inspiration from the Norwegian reform, 
corporate quotas were part of a broader equality plan. As already mentioned in the previous section, 
the Equality Law (2007) was developed by the General Secretary for Equality Policies, located within 
the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. The law established an eight-year period for public limited 
companies and listed firms to achieve gender equality in their boards, namely – no sex below 40 per 
cent or above 60 per cent of positions (Article 75). This positive action was defined by the Minister of 
Labour as addressing “democratic justice, cultural transformation and societal advancement, and 
economic fair play”, highlighting gendered recruitment processes and stereotypes as the locus of 
discrimination (González and Martínez 2012: 175). Indeed, Spanish firms have been depicted as 
traditionally recruiting from surnames, friendship and family links through opaque procedures (usually 
by a president of the board or a significant shareholder); high rates of localism, endogamy and 
concentration of ownership; low degree of rotation and high concentration of board posts. 
Furthermore, gender biases and sexist attitudes privilege the ‘traditional male stereotype’ and 
undervalue and discriminate women and male candidates that do not fit the ‘stereotype of the 
aggressive, competitive, masculine and improvising Latin male’ (González and Martínez 2012: 177; 
179; see also Mateos, Gimeno and Escot 2010). 
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As a statutory measure, it can be conceived of as a “hard quota” although its strength was watered 
down by the absence of sanctions for non-compliant companies. Instead, companies that have 
distinguished themselves in the promotion of equality receive incentives in the form of potential 
priority status for government contracts and a governmental ‘equality award’. Lower preference in the 
granting of government contracts is a weak sanction, compared to nullifying boards’ decisions in 
Belgium or suspension of board members’ compensation or dissolution in Norway (see Piscopo and 
Muntean 2013). 
This measure triggered public debate before and after the adoption of the law in 2007. The main 
political actors in the debate were the PSOE, that defended the measure on grounds of justice and 
equality, and the PP, that opposed it because, from a liberal approach, quotas were seen as a restriction 
to companies’ freedom and that incentives should be adopted instead. The main economic actors 
intervening in the debate were employers’ organisations that strongly opposed the quota provision 
mainly on the grounds of the infringement of meritocracy, which fits more general criteria of 
efficiency and competitiveness. Similarly, executive women disagreed with the hard quota because 
they believed their merits would be put into question (González and Martínez 2012: 174). The 
organization of businesswomen was also against the introduction of quotas (Organización de Mujeres 
Empresarias y Gerencia Activa, OMEGA) (CM 2006). Generally, opposition stemmed from the fact 
that women’s underrepresentation in corporate boards was attributed to ‘supply’ factors – gender 
differences in qualifications, availability and willingness to integrate corporate boards – rather than to 
‘demand’ factors – obstacles of the recruitment process and demands of the selectors (CES 2006: 17).  
Besides the government and left-wing parties, support to quotas for corporate boards only came from 
feminist organizations not related to the economic field, such as the Women Lawyers’ Association 
Themis and the Federation of Progressive Women, whose arguments emphasized the legality of quotas 
and its relevance for removing the barriers women face in selection processes (CM 2006). In a sector 
such as private business where notions of equality of opportunities, individual merit and no regulation 
of companies’ freedom of activity predominate, equality advocates did not constitute a critical mass 
and alliances to promote gender quotas were not established.  
In face of the strong resistances against the 2007 statutory provisions, from 2008 onwards the 
government shifted toward a less confrontational approach with the business community by moving 
back to ‘soft’ measures. In 2010 the programme Objective15 was launched, including sensitizing 
measures for companies to work in partnership with the government towards the implementation of 
Recommendation 15 of the Conthe Code (González and Martínez 2012). The PP government elected 
in 2011 continued this soft approach. 
As recent studies on gender studies in corporate boards have noted (Armstrong and Walby 2012; 
Piscopo and Clark 2013), the only policy intervention that has significantly increased the proportion of 
women on corporate management boards is that of legal instruments that enforce gender quotas. The 
use of voluntary measures has led only to small and slow increases in the proportion of women on 
corporate boards, as Graph 2 shows for the Spanish case. While Del Brío and Del Brío (2009) attribute 
the increase from 3.6 per cent to 6.0 per cent in the share of women in Spanish boards in the period 
2004-2007 to the Conthe Code, our assessment of both this code and the statutory quota introduced in 
2007 is less optimistic. With an average annual increase of 0.8 percentage points between 2004 and 
2007 and an average annual increase of 1.7 percentage points between 2007 and 2013, progress is too 
slow to meet the target of 40 per cent women in boards by 2015. In 2013, women only represented 
15.9 per cent of corporate members of the publicly listed companies. Furthermore, this increase is 
partly due to the Code’s recommendations to increase the presence of independent members’ in boards 
(Gonzáléz and Martínez 2012: 189). Although publicly owned firms or companies with state 
participation show a better performance with 29.5 per cent of women in their corporate boards, 
positive action has also had a moderate impact, with a 16.6 per cent increase rate in the 2008-2014 
period (Informa 2014: 10). 
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On average, companies sold on stock exchange (IBEX-35) have 2.23 women, the average board 
counting with 13.4 members. This notwithstanding, both soft and hard quotas have managed to reduce 
the number of firms with no women whatsoever in their boards. In 2004, over 60 per cent of these 
companies had all-male boards, whereas in 2010 it had shrunk to 29 per cent. Only four companies 
count with over 25 per cent of women in their boards (IESE 2014). However, when all public listed 
companies are considered (those covered by the 40-60 legal provision included in Article 75), 58 per 
cent of them still have no women on their boards (Informa 2014: 11). Diversity policies have been 
pushed in larger Spanish firms also due to the obligation to adopt an Equality Plan in companies with 
more than 250 employees, as established by the 2007 Equality Law. In many cases, increases in 
women’s presence have been achieved by recruiting female family members, which is facilitated by 
the fact that in Spain a large proportion of listed companies are family-owned, thereby raising doubts 
of tokenism. Yet, women in corporate boards are found to have more qualifications such as financial 
or economic educational background and international experience than their male board peers. It 
should also be noted that the newly appointed women are more likely to occupy the less powerful 
positions, mostly non-executive (independent) directors (González and Martínez 2012: 192-6).   
Graph 2: Percentage of Women in Publicly Listed Companies Covered by the 2007 Law, 2004-2013 
 
Source: IESE (2014: 11), Mateos et al. (2006), and European Commission (2014). 
Continuities, discontinuities and new frontiers of gender quotas  
Quotas in politics 
In light of the dramatic impact of electoral misfortune on women’s representation, in 2013 women’s 
agency within the PSOE managed to reform the gender-neutral 40/60 party quota into a zipping 
system whereby women and men alternate throughout the party lists. This was approved in 2013 in a 
programmatic conference but party statutes can only be reformed by the party national conference – 
scheduled for 2016 (PSOE 2013). Yet, this quota has already been applied on the occasion of the 2014 
European elections. The PSOE has also pledged to reform the quota law to make zipping compulsory 
to all parties. 
The consolidation of gender quotas in the political arena has not led yet to the proposal of quotas for 
other underrepresented groups, although political parties are increasingly sensitive to the inclusion of 
ethnic minority groups (e.g. migrants) in their candidate tickets for local elections, especially since the 
extension of active suffrage in 2011 to non-EU citizens. Nonetheless, the percentage of migrant 
candidates is still very low and they tend to be located in unwinnable positions (Pérez-Nievas et al. 
2014: 51). Parties with gender quotas are also adopting positive measures for other groups. The 2013 
PSOE party quota reform mentioned above also aims at progressively including candidates from 
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ethnic and sexual minorities as well as from functionally diverse citizens. These criteria have been 
included as a goal, thus having a weaker status than the mandatory gender proportions (PSOE 2013). 
Quotas in corporate boards 
Reaching the 40/60 quota in Spanish corporate boards by 2015 is a goal that will not be achieved 
without stronger government sanctions coupled with more effective equality plans within companies 
(González and Martínez, 2012: 196). However, there are no developments towards a hard regulatory 
approach, rather the opposite. The new law of capital firms the PP government adopted in 2014 (Law 
31/2014) skips gender quotas and includes instead the recommendation of adopting measures to 
include more women in boards with the aim of achieving a more balanced representation. Thus, firms’ 
selection committees will have to set their own targets for the underrepresented sex in corporate 
boards, elaborate instructions on how to achieve this target and report on its progress, along the 
principle of ‘comply or explain’. Similarly, the new Unified Good Governance Code that the National 
Committee of Value Market is drafting proposes in its Recommendation 14 a target of 30% – that is, a 
very weak interpretation of parity – and extends the deadline for implementation to 2020. Likewise, 
the current statewide Equality of Opportunities Plan (2013-2016) emphasizes sensitizing measures 
under a “framework of collaboration with companies” volunteering to meet a gender-balanced 
representation in their boards.  
While the self-regulatory approach is in continuity with former trends, new is the PP government’s 
shift in policy measures on gender quotas in boards from ‘demand’ – the gender biases corporate 
selectorates might sustain – back to ‘supply’ arguments – the characteristics of aspirant women – 
which halts progress in this field. While the 2008-2011 Equality of Opportunities Plan still focused on 
structural obstacles to women’s access, in the 2013-2016 Equality of Opportunities Plan the problem 
is framed as women’s lack of training, rather than organizational (male) resistances to women’s 
presence in boards. Accordingly, the measures proposed include women’s training in management 
skills, the establishment of networks of managerial positions, mentoring programmes, and exchange of 
best practices. This shift is in line with the business community’s liberal and individual-centered 
ideology. The programme Objetivo 15 is still in place but no activities have been organized since the 
PP assumed office in 2011
4
. 
Recently, female economic actors, such as businesswomen, have organized to challenge the low 
supply of suitable female candidates. In February 2014 the Federation of Executive Women 
(Federación de Mujeres Directivas, Ejecutivas, Profesionales y Empresarias, FEDEPE) signed an 
agreement with the Spanish Employers Association to promote qualified women in decision-making 
positions in companies and employers’ organisations5. In 2006 the same organisation had already 
launched an open directory of women candidates for corporate boards (Díaz García and González 
Moreno 2012: 59). Similar initiatives are taking place elsewhere in Spain. In Catalonia, the 
Observatory Women, Business and Economy, located within the Chamber of Commerce of Barcelona, 
has also set an open directory of businesswomen and designed a map of the relevant competencies 
required to lead a business, thus challenging the traditional opacity in the definition of merit and the 
gender bias of how it is often defined
6
. 
 
                                                     
4 http://www.objetivo15.net/. 
5 http://www.mujeresdirectivas.es/es/te-interesa/noticias/item/15-fedepe-y-ceoe. 
6 http://www.donaempresaeconomia.org/. 
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New frontiers 
As said in the introduction, the 2007 Equality Law also mandated the application of the principle of 
gender-balanced presence in public administrations bodies, advisory boards, and committees for the 
selection of personnel and assessment of merits (Articles 52-54). The general retrenchment in Spanish 
gender equality institutions and policies brought by the Popular Party, a vocal opponent to gender 
quotas, coupled with its ‘austerity’ programme might be detrimental to progress in women’s 
descriptive representation. For example, regarding the representation of women in the General Council 
of Judicial Power, a constitutional body that governs the judiciary, increased from 11% in 2007 to 
35% in 2010, and slightly decreased to 33% in 2013. As regards the Central Bank, women councillors 
increased from 25% in 2008 to 44% in 2011 but have since then decreased again to 25%. In the 
Economic and Social Council women represented 15% of members in 2007, 23% in 2010 and 18% in 
2013 (Instituto de la Mujer 2014).  
The reports issued by various Ministries also point at significant progress right after its 
implementation but stagnation afterwards. The Ministry of Economy 2011 report about the 
implementation of the Equality Law concerning advisory boards claims that the 40-60 principle is 
generally applied for the Ministry’s representatives in advisory boards with 42% women and 58% 
men. Yet, regarding board members with responsibilities as presidents or deputy-presidents, women’s 
presence decreases to 36%. The Ministry of Employment in its 2011 report on the equality law also 
claims that committees for the selection of public administration personnel have taken into account the 
balanced presence of women and men. Further analysis is needed to check on the actual composition 
of advisory boards and selection committees.  
Conclusions 
Spain has developed a differential approach to gender quotas, with strong regulation for electoral 
quotas and self-regulation and soft law for corporate boards. How to account for this difference? 
While in the case of quotas in politics we mainly find enabling factors and actors that led to a 
harmonizing sequence of quota adoption and good fit across systemic, normative and practical 
institutions, in the case of corporate boards the interaction of quotas with the institutional 
configuration in the economic field has produced conflict and yielded as a result a highly disjointed 
sequence, as it is summarized in Table 2.  
 
Table 2: Sequence of quota reforms 
 
 Electoral quotas: 
Harmonizing sequence and good fit 
Corporate board quotas: 
Disjointed sequence and conflict 
Systemic 
institutions 
 Electoral rules of PR with closed 
and blocked lists. 
 Contagion between parties to 
promote party quotas. 
 Strong state intervention with hard 
quota Law 3/2007 including strong 
sanctions (withdrawal of party lists) 
 Constitutional Court 2008 sentence 
upheld quotas. 
 Self-regulation Conthe code as a soft quota. 
 No contagion among companies and low 
visibility of corporate boards. 
 Weak state intervention with hard quota Law 
3/2007 but no sanctions –only incentives- 
and 8-year application. 
 Soft approach (Objective 15) from 2008- 
Normative 
institutions 
 Ideas of substantive equality and 
politics of presence, defended by 
 Ideas of individual equality of opportunity 
and meritocracy (expertise, competitiveness, 
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party feminists with international 
cross-loading, spread across most 
political parties.  
 Ideas of individual equality of 
opportunity and quotas as restricting 
parties’ freedom defended by the PP 
but rejected by the Constitutional 
Court. 
efficiency) defended by employers’ 
organisations and executive women to 
strongly oppose quotas. 
 Ideas that women’s underrepresentation 
depends on supply rather than demand 
factors prevail. 
 Liberal ideas of minimal state: quotas seen as 
restriction to companies’ freedom 
 
Practical 
institutions 
 Parties’ self-reform through prior 
voluntary quotas was key to the 
implementation of the statutory 
quota. 
 Yet, not all gendered recruitment 
processes have been eliminated (i.e. 
gendered allocation of winnable 
positions in party lists).  
 Recruitment of corporate board members 
unaffected by quota reforms. 
 Gendered recruitment processes strongly 
embedded in the opaque and endogamic 
practices of Spanish firms.  
 
The sequential pattern of quota reforms in politics began with (left-wing) parties pursuing self-reform 
in their recruitment practices by adopting party quotas to only subsequently proceed with normative-
legal reform(s). Critical actors within parties, namely party feminists, placed the issue on the agenda, 
developed strategic action and discourse based on the politics of presence and equality of results, using 
other European countries, parties and transnational women’s organizations as a source of inspiration 
and legitimacy. Electoral rules of proportional representation with closed and blocked lists worked 
facilitated the implementation of party quotas. When the statutory quota was passed the main 
resistance to gender quotas came from the Popular Party, whose unconstitutionality appeal based on 
individual equality of opportunities and parties’ freedom was rejected on grounds of substantive 
equality. The tough sanction imposed on non-compliant parties (i.e. the withdrawal of party lists) 
secured an effective implementation of the gender-balanced principle. 
In sharp contrast, in the case of quotas in corporate boards, the prevalence of self-regulation at the 
systemic level coupled with normative institutions that prioritize liberal notions of freedom of activity 
and criteria of individual merit and ability have produced a heavily disjointed sequence. Whereas 
Europeanization acted as a cross-loading factor that enabled political actors to learn from other 
European countries’ and parties’ experiences, in the case of quotas in corporate boards the Norwegian 
example was inspirational but not determinant. The hard quota introduced by the PSOE government as 
a part of a broader equality plan failed to address informal gender-biased practices of recruitment. The 
business community, both women and men, rejected the imposition of sanctions for boards not 
meeting the stipulated target of women’s representation and, with the support of the Popular Party, 
managed to reintroduce a soft approach and gained the discursive battle by framing lack of diversity in 
boards as a matter of low supply of qualified women. Indeed, the observed increases in women’s 
representation are partially due to the fact that boards have been required to recruit independent 
members, then opening the door to “outsiders”. In sum, most of the enabling factors – classified in the 
systemic and normative institutions – that exercised pressure in favour of gender quotas in politics 
were weak or missing in the economic sector and, thus, could not counteract the strong oppositional 
factors and actors. It is yet to be seen if the recent mobilization of businesswomen in favour of hard 
quotas will succeed in challenging the male-biased discourse of ‘merit’ that puts women’s talents to 
ongoing test, while men’s capacities are left unquestioned. 
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